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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
Defendant agrees with plaintiffs "Jurisdictional Statement".
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Was the trial court correct in deciding, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs failure to
provide defendant with accurate billing instructions induced defendant to send billing notices
to plaintiffs customer, thereby absolving defendant of any liability for allegedly disclosing
confidential information?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant agrees with plaintiffs statement of the "Standard of Review."
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Defendant agrees with plaintiff that there are no determinative constitutional or
statutory provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Valley Oil Transportation, Inc. ("Valley") sued Union Pacific Railroad Company
("Union Pacific") in June 1998, alleging claims of: (1) breach of contract; and (2) trade secret
misappropriation.

Valley claims that Union Pacific breached a "Rail Transportation

Contract" ("Rail Contract" or "Contract"), which Valley had with Union Pacific, when Union
Pacific disclosed confidential rail rate information to one of Valley's customer's, Laidlaw
Environmental Services ("Laidlaw").
On October 19, 1995, Valley had entered into a contract with Laidlaw to transport
1

hazardous waste to various disposal locations in the United States. On December 22, 1997,
Valley entered into the Rail Contract with Union Pacific, whereby Union Pacific agreed to
transport Laidlaw's hazardous waste under rates set forth in the Contract. According to the
"Billing" clause in the Contract, for each shipment, Valley was to provide Union Pacific with
a bill of lading and/or billing instructions referencing the contract number.
For each shipment, Valley faxed Union Pacific a bill of lading and shipping manifests
("Manifests"). Contained in the Manifests were specific instructions that "all billing" be sent
to Laidlaw. No other billing instructions appeared anywhere else in the shipping documents
and no other discussion of where the bills were to be sent took place between the two parties.
Once Union Pacific became aware of these billing instructions, it stopped billing
Valley and started billing Laidlaw. Union Pacific sent a total of three billing notices to
Laidlaw over a two month period before Valley contacted Union Pacific and advised that the
bills should be sent to Valley. As it turned out, the billing instructions in the Manifests had
been erroneously provided by Valley. As soon as this was brought to Union Pacific's
attention, Union Pacific stopped billing Laidlaw.
According to a "Confidentiality" clause in the Contract, neither party could disclose
the terms of the Contract without the written consent of the other party. Valley claims that
when Union Pacific billed Laidlaw, Union Pacific breached this confidentiality clause
because the bills included supporting confidential rate information contained in the Contract.
However, Union Pacific would not have disclosed this information, were it not for the
erroneous billing instructions contained in the Manifests which Valley faxed to Union
2

Pacific.
Therefore, it was appropriate for the trial court to rule, as a matter of law, that
Valley's failure to provide accurate billing instructions caused Union Pacific to bill Laidlaw
and that Union Pacific is thereby absolved of any liability for its alleged breach of the Rail
Contract's "Confidentiality" provision.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiffs Complaint alleged: (1) a breach of contract; and (2) misappropriation of
trade secrets. R. 1-19. In its Answer, defendant denied both allegations. R. 23-25.
Extensive discovery developed all of the pertinent information available. No relevant
facts are genuinely disputed by either party. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on December 6, 2000, arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs Complaint should be
dismissed because defendant's alleged breach of contract was induced by the inaccurate
billing instructions provided by plaintiff. R. 138-140.
On December 19, 2000, plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Paragraph Three of the
affidavit of Cy Gruenloh, which stated that a Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest was a
"shipping paper" upon which a railroad may rely for shipping instructions concerning routing
and billing. R.263-296; R.237-238. On December 20,2000, plaintiff filed its Memorandum
in Opposition to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 300-394. On December 28,
2000, defendant filed its Memorandum in Opposition to plaintiffs Motion to Strike and its
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 397-400; R. 410-412.
On January 2, 2001, the trial court heard arguments on the motions. On plaintiffs
3

Motion to Strike, the court granted the motion to the extent that Mr. Gruenloh's observations
expressed conclusions of law, but denied the motion to the extent that his observations
expressed his understanding of the custom and practice of the shipping industry. The trial
court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ruling, as a matter of law, that
"plaintiff failed to provide defendant with accurate billing instructions as required by the rail
contract and that such failure was the reason for defendant's sending of the billing notices
to Laidlaw. . .excusing] defendant from any liability for its alleged breach of the Rail
Contract's confidentiality provision". R. 459-460.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On October 19,1995, Valley's wholly owned subsidiary, Maple Oil Products,

Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Valley"), entered into a contract with Laidlaw
to transport hazardous wastes from the Tooele Army Depot to various disposal site
destinations in the United States. R. 3 (Plaintiffs Complaint f 14).
2.

Laidlaw had previously entered into a contract with the federal government to

remove and dispose of such wastes. Laidlaw in turn subcontracted with Vailley to provide
transportation services, including transportation by rail, in support of Laidlaw's obligations
under the government contract. R. 3-4 (Plaintiffs Complaint ^f 14-16); R. 163 (Fetting
Depo. pp. 30-31); R. 185-186 (Pritchett Depo. pp. 20-23). The October 1995 contract
between Valley and Laidlaw is entitled "Subcontract Agreement No. P30-21" (hereinafter
"Subcontract"). Paragraph IV of the Subcontract sets forth the rates Valley zigreed to charge
Laidlaw for transporting the waste by rail to three anticipated destinations as follows:
4

a.

20 per pound to Norris Environmental Services, Los Angeles, California;

b.

2Vi0 per pound to Clean Harbors, Chicago, Illinois; and

c.

30 per pound to Empack, Inc., Deer Park, Texas.

In agreeing to these rates Laidlaw guaranteed Valley a minimum of weight of 160,000
pounds per shipment. R. 179 -180 (Exhibit 1 to Fetting Depo).
3.

On December 22,1997, Valley entered into the Rail Contract, No. ICC-UP-C-

33895, with Union Pacific whereby Union Pacific agreed to transport Valley's hazardous
waste shipments going to Houston, Texas for a price of $3,360.00 per railcar. The Rail
Contract was to expire by its own terms on December 22, 1998. R. 9-17 (Exhibit 1 to
Plaintiffs Complaint).
4.

The Rail Contract contained a "Billing Provision" which specified that

"Shipments shipped by customer under this Agreement shall be accompanied by a bill of
lading and/or billing instructions referencing this Agreement's number,..." R. 10 (Exhibit
1 to Plaintiffs Complaint).
5.

The Rail Contract contained a "Confidentiality" provision which specified that:

"No party may disclose any of the terms of this agreement to any non-party without the prior
written consent of the other parties . . . " R. 12 (Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint).
6.

When Valley was preparing the form of its bill of lading, at Valley's request

Union Pacific provided assistance to Valley over the telephone concerning the format of the
bill of lading and how to send it to Union Pacific. R. 192-194 (Pritchett Depo. pp. 48-54).
However, no discussion ever took place concerning what the bill of lading should reflect
5

about where Union Pacific should send the freight bills. R. 196 (Pritchett Depo. p. 63).
Valley did not identify itself in the bill of lading as the party to be billed because Valley
assumed that Union Pacific would bill Valley on the basis that Valley had been identified in
the bill of lading as the consignor. R. 196 (Pritchett Depo. p. 63).
7.

Whenever there was to be a shipment, Valley would fax the following

documents to Union Pacific:
a.

the Fax Cover Sheet, with the name of Maple Oil on the top;

b.

the Bill of Lading, which provided shipping instructions and identified
the uniform hazardous waste manifest documents accompanying each
railcar; and

c.

the Uniform Hazardous Wastes Manifest ("Manifest"), which under
federal law, must be created for each truck load of hazardous waste.

R. 222 - 227 (Exhibit 1 to Thompson Depo.); R.248-262 (Exhibit 2 to Gruenloh Aff.); R. 192
193 (Pritchett Depo. pp. 48-49).
8.

None of the above documents ever referenced the Rail Contract number, as

required by the Contract's billing provision.
9.

Each and every Manifest which Valley faxed to Union Pacific contained the

following billing instructions in Block 15, under the heading "Special Handlmg Instructions
and Additional Information":
Laidlaw is the contractor for this facility's waste. Please route all billing
and correspondence to: P. O. Box 140. Saukville, WI 53080 [Laidlaw5s
address].
6

(Emphasis added). R. 224 - 227 (Exhibit 1 to Thompson Depo.); R.250-262 (Exhibit 2 to
Gruenloh Aff.)
10.

The Manifest was the only document Valley faxed to Union Pacific which

contained instructions as to where Union Pacific should send its freight bills. R. 238 - 239
(Gruenloh Aff. f7).
11.

A Manifest, like a bill of lading, is legally considered to be a "shipping paper".

R. 273 (49 CFR § 172.205(h)). When transporting hazardous waste a common carrier
railroad may rely on a Manifest for shipping and billing instructions. R. 237-238 (Gruenloh
Aff. Tf 3). When the bill of lading does not contain billing instructions, but the Manifest does,
Union Pacific follows the billing instructions contained in the Manifest. R.238 (Gruenloh
Aff. 16).
12.

Although the billing instructions in Block 15 of the Manifest had been inserted

by Laidlaw so that Valley would know to bill Laidlaw, Union Pacific had no knowledge or
reason to know of the business relationship Valley had with Laidlaw. R.166 (Fetting Depo.
p.43); R. 239 (Gruenloh Aff. % 9). In fact, Union Pacific was unaware that these were
Laidlaw's instructions to Valley only.
13.

On February 10, 1998, Valley faxed shipping papers (bill of lading and

Manifests) with instructions covering the movement of three rail cars to Deer Park, Texas.
R. 238-239 (Gruenloh Aff. f 7).
14.

In response to the billing instructions contained in the Manifests, Union Pacific

sent three "Past Due Notices" for freight charges to Laidlaw. These notices were dated
7

May 3, 1998, June 7, 1998, and July 5, 1998, and included an amount due of 83,360 and the
shipping rate basis for such charge. R. 232 - 236 (Exhibit 3 to Thompson Depo.). This is
the alleged confidential rate information which Valley claims Union Pacific improperly
disclosed.
15.

Prior to February 10, 1998, without any billing instructions set forth in the bill

of lading, and not having noticed the billing instructions in Block 15 of the Manifests, Union
Pacific had been billing Valley based upon its status as the consignor, shipper or customer
generating the shipments. R. 238 - 239 (Gruenloh Aff. ffif 7-8).
16.

It is common practice for Union Pacific to bill the consignor of a shipment

without written instructions to do so. It is also not unusual for the consignor to instruct the
Railroad to send freight bills to a third party, such as Laidlaw. R. 238 (Gruenloh Aff. f 5).
17.

Upon discovering that Union Pacific had sent billing notices to Laidlaw based

upon the instructions in the Manifests, Valley modified its bill of lading to include specific
instructions in the bill of lading that the freight bills should be sent to Valley. R. 199
(Pritchett Depo. pp. 75-76).
18.

At the time Union Pacific sent the notices to Laidlaw, it had no knowledge or

reason to know that Valley had the Subcontract with Laidlaw, that Valley's profit under the
Subcontract was tied to the transportation rates being charged by Union Pacific, or that
disclosure of such rate information to Laidlaw, particularly with Valley's permission, would
cause damage to Valley. R. 239 (Gruenloh Aff. f 9).
19.

While Laidlaw used the rate information contained in Union Pacific's billing
8

notices to assist in negotiating a lower rail transportation rate with Valley, Laidlaw had
determined as early as the Fall of 1997 that the Subcontract with Valley needed to be
terminated or amended because of excessive shipping costs. These excessive costs were the
result of Valley billing Laidlaw at a substantially higher rate than allowed in the Contract.
R. 158, 164-165 (Fetting Depo. 10-11, 36-38).
20.

An example of Laidlaw's disagreement with Valley's billing practices under

the Subcontract appears in the Laidlaw documents attached as Exhibit 1, Enclosure 1 to the
Fetting Deposition. The documents refer to a shipment containing 135,260 pounds of
hazardous waste moving to Norris in Los Angeles, California. The applicable Subcontract
rate was the 160,000 pound minimum multiplied by 2JZ5 per pound for a total bill of $3,200.
However, Valley billed Laidlaw $4,783, which is more than 150% of the specified contract
rate. R. 176 (Exhibit 1 to Fetting Depo.).
21.

Laidlaw had concluded that it needed to cut costs by either lowering the rates

which Valley was charging or by moving its transloading operation (the operation of
transloading the waste from truck to rail) from Valley's rail siding in Murray to Laidlaw's
own facility at Clive, Utah. R. 158-159, 165 (Fetting Depo. 10-13, 38-40).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Rail Contract between Valley and Union Pacific clearly required that Valley
provide Union Pacific with accurate billing instructions for each shipment of hazardous
waste that Union Pacific was to transport. Valley failed to comply with this provision when
it faxed Union Pacific Manifests with erroneous instructions that "all billing" be routed to
9

Laidlaw. Since the billing provision of the Rail Contract is clear and unambiguous, the
parole evidence rule precludes Valley from introducing any extrinsic evidence, such as prior
course of dealing, to contradict or vary the terms of this provision. Course of dealing or any
other extrinsic evidence would not be relevant anyway because each shipment was governed
by its own contract, pursuant to the terms of the Rail Contract.
The Manifests which Valley provided to Union Pacific were legal shipping documents
which Valley and Union Pacific could rely on for billing instructions. Valley does not
dispute that the Manifests were shipping documents. It is common practice for shipping
documents to specifically identify the party who is to be billed. It was therefore appropriate
for Union Pacific to follow the instructions on the Manifests and bill Laidlaw accordingly.
Despite Valley's claims to the contrary, the billing instructions which Valley faxed
to Laidlaw were clearly consistent with the Rail Contract's "Confidentiality" provision
because the billing instructions specifically stated that "all billing" was to be routed to
Laidlaw. Therefore, when Union Pacific billed Laidlaw, it did so on the basis that Valley
had provided "prior written consent" to the disclosure, as required by the "Confidentiality"
provision.
Finally, Valley should have directed Union Pacific to bill Valley and ignore the billing
instructions on the manifests. Valley's failure to provide Union Pacific with accurate billing
instructions, as required by the Rail Contract, was the sole reason Union Pacific billed
Laidlaw and disclosed confidential rate information. Therefore, any alleged breach of
contract on Union Pacific's part was excused by Valley's breach of contract.
10

ARGUMENT
I.

THE UNDISPUTED FACTS REVEAL THAT THE CONTRACT'S
BILLING PROVISION WAS PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS; THAT
PAROLE EVIDENCE CANNOT BE USED TO VARY THE BILLING
PROVISION'S PLAIN MEANING; AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S
BILLING INSTRUCTIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE
BILLING PROVISION
A.

The Contract's requirement that Plaintiff Provide Defendant with
Accurate Billing Instructions was Plain and Unambiguous

The "Billing" provision of the Rail Contract, requiring the inclusion of billing
instructions, reads as follows:
Shipments shipped by Customer under this agreement shall be
accompanied by a bill of lading and/or billing instructions referencing
this Agreement's Number.
R.10. (Emphasis added).
The Customer referred to in this provision is Valley. While Valley claims that the
language in this provision is ambiguous, it is evident from even a cursory reading that the
language is clear and unambiguous. There are only two possible interpretations of this
sentence: (1) each shipment must be accompanied by a bill of lading and billing instructions
referencing the Agreement's Number; or (2) each shipment must be accompanied by a bill
of lading or billing instructions referencing this Agreement's Number.

Whether the

Agreement Number refers to the bill of lading, the billing instructions, or both, is irrelevant.
If the first interpretation is used (and it is likely this is the interpretation the parties
would have intended), then Valley was required to provide Union Pacific with a bill of lading
11

and billing instructions for each shipment. Of course the term "billing instructions" must be
taken to mean "accurate billing instructions". Otherwise the term is meaningless. Valley
failed to provide Union Pacific with accurate billing instructions when it faixed its bill of
lading and Manifests containing instructions which knew, or reasonably should have known,
were incorrect. Nowhere in any of the shipping documents did Valley provide accurate
billing instructions or indicate that Union Pacific was to disregard the billing instructions that
were being provided. Therefore, under this first interpretation, Valley breactied the billing
provision of the Rail Contract.
If the second - more strained - interpretation of the billing provision is used, Valley
could provide Union Pacific with either a bill of lading or billing instructions. However, the
term "billing instructions" must again be taken to mean "accurate billing instructions".
Under this interpretation, if Valley had provided a bill of lading and no billing instructions,
then conceivably it could have been in compliance with the Contract, and Union Pacific
likely would have continued to bill Valley as the consignor. However, Valley chose to
provide Union Pacific with a bill of lading and billing instructions (contained in the
Manifests) advising Union Pacific to bill Laidlaw. Having elected to provide billing
instructions, Valley was obligated under the Contract to ensure that the instructions were
accurate. Therefore, under this second interpretation, Valley was still in breach of the
Contract by failing to provide Union Pacific with accurate billing instructions.
Rather than put forward any evidence that the Rail Contract's billing provision was
ambiguous, Valley has provided a plethora of case law dealing with ambiguity in contracts.
12

However, none of the case law provided is relevant. No amount of case law can change the
fact that the Rail Contract clearly and unambiguously required that Valley provide Union
Pacific with accurate billing instructions, and that Valley failed to comply with this
requirement.
B.

The Parole Evidence Rule Precludes Valley's Use of Extrinsic
Evidence to Vary The Unambiguous Terms of The Contract

The general rule denying the admissibility of parole evidence to vary written contracts
is applicable to the contractual provisions contained in a shipping contract. Central R.R. v.
Hasselkuls. 17 S.E. 838 (Ga. 1893) (bill of lading accepted by railroad must be looked to as
final repository and sole evidence of the contract of carriage). Where the language has
ordinary meaning, or is plain and unambiguous, parole evidence is not admissible for the
purpose of showing the meaning of the contract. Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to
contradict the clear terms of a written agreement or to create an ambiguity where none
otherwise exists. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah
1990); ITT Corp. v. LTX Corp.. 926 F.2d 1258 (1st Cir. 1991). Such rule applies regardless
of the subsequent acts or declarations of the parties. Where the language is plain and
unambiguous, evidence of course of dealing or practical construction put upon the words by
the acts or declarations of the parties is not admissible to supply an interpretation of the
document. Woods v. Bromley. 241 P.2d 1103 (Nev. 1952); In re: Davidson's Trust Estate.
47 A.2d 145 (Pa. 1946); 29A Am. Jur.2d, Evidence § 1100.
The only language providing any billing instructions is clear and unequivocal: "route
13

all billing" to Laidlaw (emphasis provided). R. 250 - 262. Thus, parole evidence regarding
the parties5 informal understanding and/or course of conduct which is in contradiction of this
unambiguous instruction is not admissible. In any event, no "course of dealing" had been
established since each shipment was governed by its own contract which contained, or should
have contained, its own billing instructions. There can be "no course of dealing" where the
consignor has the continuing power to modify its shipping instructions for each shipment,
including instructions regarding where to send the freight bills. In this regard please see the
shipping papers attached to the Thompson Deposition (R. 249) which contain space for
Valley to insert "Special Instructions" and "Switch Billing" instructions for each new
shipment. This would have been the logical place for Valley to insert the correct billing
instructions and/or explain that the instructions in the manifests did not apply to Union
Pacific. And, in fact, once Valley became aware that Union Pacific was billing Laidlawr
based upon the erroneous billing instructions contained in the Manifests, Valley modified 1he
instructions on its bill of lading, specifically stating that Valley was the party to be billed.
C.

The Billing Instructions in the Manifests were Consistent with the
Contract's "Billing" Provision

Valley claims that the billing instructions contained in the Manifest conflicted with
the "Confidentiality" provision of the Contract. In its brief Valley refers to the second part
of the Billing Provision which provides that:
in the event of a conflict between the terms of th[e] agreement
and conditions contained on the bill of lading and/or billing
instructions, the terms of the Agreement shall govern.
R.10.

14

The Manifests which Valley provided to Union Pacific contained specific and
unambiguous billing instructions that "all billing" be routed to Laidlaw. These instructions
were clearly consistent with the Contract's "Confidentiality" provision because, from Union
Pacific's perspective, Valley had unequivocally consented to Union Pacific's disclosure of the
confidential rail rate information when it directed that the freight bills be sent to Laidlaw.
Union Pacific did not have a duty to second guess Valley's intent in light of such explicit billing
instructions.
EL

THE MANIFESTS WHICH VALLEY FAXED TO UNION PACIFIC
WERE LEGAL SHIPPING DOCUMENTS WHICH UNION PACIFIC
COULD RELY ON FOR BILLING INSTRUCTIONS
Valley denies that the Manifest which it provided to Union Pacific could have been used

for billing instructions because: (1) the Manifests were not prepared by Valley; (2) neither
Valley nor Laidlaw intended the Manifests to contain billing instructions to be used by Union
Pacific; (3) Union Pacific and Valley intended the billing to be as per the Contract; and (4) the
Manifests themselves were not billing documents. Brief of Appellant p. 14. However, the
undisputed facts and law reveal that the Manifest was both a shipping and a billing document
and could be reasonably relied upon by Union Pacific for billing instructions.
A.

That the Manifests were not Prepared by Valley is Unimportant

The fact that the Manifests were prepared by Laidlaw is irrelevant for the purposes of
determining whether the Manifests were billing documents upon which Union Pacific could

15

rely. This argument would only make sense if the Manifests had been sent directly from
Laidlaw to Union Pacific, or if Union Pacific had otherwise been made aware 1hat the Manifests
had not been prepared by Valley. However, the bill of lading and Manifests were faxed directly
from Valley to Union Pacific without explanation. Prior to, or at the time of faxing the shipping
documents, Valley had an opportunity to ensure that Union Pacific did not follow the erroneous
billing instructions on the Manifests. Valley could have advised Union Pacific to disregard Ihe
billing instructions or provided Union Pacific with correct billing instructions, as required by
the Rail Contract. Valley did neither. Therefore, it was reasonable for Union Pacific to assume
that the billing instructions on the Manifests were accurate and generated, or at least approved,
by Valley.
B.

The Intent of the Parties is Irrelevant when the Language of Contract
is Plain and Unambiguous

That neither Laidlaw nor Valley intended the Manifest to be used as a billing document
is also unimportant because neither party ever conveyed this intent to Union Pacific. From
Union Pacific's perspective, the plain language of Block 15 in the Manifest indicated that the
Manifest was being used as a billing document and that all billing was to be routed to Laidlaw.
Valley's intent is not admissible when the language of a contract, as in this case, is clear and
unequivocal, and where such intent was never conveyed to Union Pacific.
C.

Valley and Union Pacific Intended to Bill as per the Contract

Union Pacific is in agreement with Valley that the parties intended to bill as per the
Contract. The billing provision of the Contract required that the shipper provide accurate
16

billing instructions. Valley failed to comply with this provision. From Union Pacific's
perspective, providing billing instructions in the Manifests, for each shipment of hazardous
waste, was consistent with the billing provision of the Contract. Therefore, it was reasonable
for Union Pacific to rely on the billing instructions contained in the Manifest.
D.

The Undisputed Facts and Law Reveal that the Manifests were both
Shipping and Billing Documents

Valley has offered the testimony of its General Manager, Tom Pritchett, as evidence that
the Manifests could not be considered as billing documents. R. 331 (Pritchett Aff. f 11). It is
not important that Mr. Pritchett may not personally have considered the Manifests to be billing
documents. What is important is that the undisputed facts and law show that Manifests legally
may be considered, and in fact are considered,

"shipping paper[s]" (R. 273 (49 CFR

§ 172.205(h))) upon which a railroad may rely for shipping and billing instructions. R. 237-238
(Gruenloh Aff. ^f 3). It is common practice for such "shipping papers" to identify the party
responsible for paying the freight bill. Also, it is not unusual for a shipper to give the Railroad
instructions to send the freight bill to a third party. R. 238 (Gruenloh Aff. | 5). In the absence
of any billing instructions in the bill of lading, it was reasonable for Union Pacific to follow the
only billing instructions provided which were contained in the Manifests. R. 238 (Gruenloh
Aff. f 6). In fact, under the language of the billing provision of the Rail Contract, Union Pacific
had a affirmative duty to adhere to the Manifests' billing instructions. R. 238 (Gruenloh Aff.
T[ 7). Therefore, Union Pacific could reasonably conclude, based on the language of the Rail
Contract and the billing instructions contained in the Manifests, that the Manifests were billing
documents.
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III.

UNION PACIFIC DID NOT BREACH THE CONFIDENTIALITY
CLAUSE OF THE RAIL CONTRACT WHEN IT DISCLOSED RATE
INFORMATION TO LAIDLAW, BECAUSE THE BILLING
INSTRUCTIONS
VALLEY
FAXED
TO
UNION
PACIFIC
CONSTITUTED "PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT" TO THIS
DISCLOSURE, AND THESE BILLING INSTRUCTIONS WERE
CONSISTENT WITH THE "NOTICES" PROVISION OF THE
CONTRACT
A.

Union Pacific Did Not Breach the Confidentiality Provision of the
Contract When it Disclosed Confidential Rate Information to Laidlaw

The Confidentiality provision of the Rail Contract states in part:
No party may disclose any of the terms of this Agreement to any non-part/
without the prior written consent of the other parties.. .
R. 12. Valley alleges that Union Pacific breached this provision when it sent billing notices
containing confidential rate information to Laidlaw. However, all the Manifests Valley semi to
Union Pacific contained instructions that "all billing" be sent to Laidlaw. Therefore, it was
reasonable for Union Pacific to conclude that such explicit billing instructions given for each
shipment clearly constituted "prior written consent" under the Contract. If Valley did not want
Union Pacific to follow these billing instructions, it should have advised Union Pacific
accordingly or provided accurate billing instructions.
Valley states that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the Manifest's billing
instructions constituted the requisite "consent" to disclose rate information under the Contract
because the Manifest was not the only shipping document which Valley senl to Union Pacific.
Valley claims that the trial court attached too much weight to the Manifest and not enough
weight to the other documents. Brief of Appellant p. 20 of Valley's. However, the Manifest
was the only document which addressed where the freight bills should be sent. The other
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documents, including the bill of lading where billing instructions are normally contained, were
silent on this matter. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the Manifests' specific
billing instructions constituted "consent" to disclose the confidential rate information to
Laidlaw.
B.

Valley Complied with the "Notices" Provision of the Contract When
it Faxed the Billing Instructions to Union Pacific

Valley claims that any consent to disclose its confidential rate information had to be sent
to Union Pacific in a manner consistent with the Contract's "Notices" Provision. Brief of
Appellant p. 23. The "Notices" provision states that:
any notices given by any party under this Agreement shall be in writing,
and shall be effective upon delivery to the applicable party by hand, by
wire or other electronic device, or by U.S. Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested, addressed in accordance with the following:
To: UP

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
1416 DODGE STREET
OMAHA, NE 68179

R. 11. (Emphasis added).
Assuming, that the Contract did require that all notices, including billing instructions,
be sent to Union Pacific in a manner consistent with the "Notices" provision, Valley complied
with this provision when it faxed the billing instructions to Union Pacific. Valley incorrectly
interprets the "Notices" provision to mean that all notices had to be mailed to Union Pacific.
Under the language of the "Notices" provision, "notices.. .shall be effective upon delivery to
the applicable party by hand, by wire or other electronic device". (Emphasis added).
Presumably "other electronic device" includes a facsimile. Therefore, Valley complied with
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the "Notices Provision" of the Contract when it faxed billing instructions to Union Pacific,
advising Union Pacific to send all bills to Laidlaw.
IV.

THE UNDISPUTED FACTS REVEAL THAT UNION PACIFIC IS
ABSOLVED FROM ANY LIABILITY UNDER THE CONTRACT
BECAUSE UNION PACIFIC'S ALLEGED BREACH OF CONTRACT
WAS INDUCED BY VALLEY'S BREACH OF CONTRACT
A plaintiff cannot prevail in an action for a breach of contract, for which breach that

plaintiff is responsible. Hughes Produce Co. v. Pulley. 155 P. 337, 339 (Utah 1916). In
Hughes, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract after the defendant failed to
provide plaintiff with a certain quantity of potatoes. However, under a provision of the
Contract the plaintiff was required to provide the defendant with sacks for these potatoes. The
plaintiff failed to provide the sacks and consequently the defendant was umible to deliver the
potatoes to the plaintiff. The court concluded that it could not "excuse the plaintiff from
furnishing the sacks while [enforcing] the obligation of the defendant to deliver the potatoes".
I d at 339.
In this case Valley failed to comply with the billing provision of the Contract, which
required that Valley provide Union Pacific with accurate billing instructions. It is undisputed
that the only billing instructions which Valley provided to Union Pacific were contained in the
Manifests that had been faxed to Union Pacific. These instructions clearly stated that "all
billing" was to be sent to Laidlaw. Union Pacific complied with these instructions and billed
Laidlaw. Had Valley not breached the Contract by providing erroneous billing instructions,
Union Pacific would not have billed Laidlaw. The only reason Union Pacific billed Laidlaw
was because of the faulty and inaccurate shipping papers provided by Valley which led Union
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Pacific to believe that the freight bills should be sent to Laidlaw. Had Valley inserted correct
instruction in the bills of lading and/or advised Union Pacific to disregard the instructions in the
Manifests, Laidlaw would never have been billed. Therefore, Union Pacific should not be held
liable for any damages Valley may have suffered from Union Pacific's disclosure of
confidential information when it was Valley's actions which caused the alleged breach of
contract by Union Pacific.
Valley claims that because of "Union Pacific's knowledge and involvement in setting
up the Bill of Lading/Manifest System", that this somehow absolved Valley of its obligation
under the Contract to provide Union Pacific with accurate billing instructions. Brief of
Appellant p. 16. However, it is important to understand that when Valley was designing its bill
of lading, any assistance Union Pacific provided was done over the telephone and did not
address the issue of billing instructions, i.e. whether and where to insert instructions directing
where Union Pacific should send the freight bills. R. 192-194,196 (Pritchett Depo. pp. 48-54,
63). That there was no discussion of billing at the time makes sense in light of the fact that the
Contract already required that Valley provide Union Pacific with accurate billing instructions
each time there was to be a shipment.
V. UNION PACIFIC DID NOT MISAPPROPRIATE VALLEY'S "TRADE SECRET"
Although not addressed in Valley's brief, Valley alleged in its complaint that Union
Pacific misappropriated its "trade secret" (the confidential rail rate Union Pacific was charging
Valley under the Rail Contract) in violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, UCA § 13-24-1
et seq. (the "Act"), when it sent the billing notices containing the rail rate to Laidlaw. However,
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under the plain language of the Act, there is no "misappropriation" where the disclosure of the
trade secret is made with the owner's "express or implied consent" (§ 13-24-2(2)(d))3 or where
there is no "duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use." (§ 13-24-2(b)(ii)(D)).
As set forth above, Valley provided Union Pacific with shipping papers containing
specific written instructions to bill Laidlaw, and as a direct consequence of such instructions
Union Pacific sent the billing notices to Laidlaw. Such clear and uncontradicted instructions
contained in official shipping papers received repeatedly and directly from Valley constitutes
Valley's express or at least implied consent for Union Pacific to disclose the rate information
to Laidlaw. As provided by the Rail Contract, having received such consent, Union Pacific was
no longer under any "duty to maintain its secrecy." Therefore, Valley's claim for
misappropriation of a trade secret is misguided.
CONCLUSION
In its brief, Valley has failed to focus on the facts which are clearly determinative in
resolving this case. Instead, Valley has introduced several "red herrings" in am attempt to raise
issues of fact. However, there are no material facts which are genuinely in dispute. It is
undisputed that the Rail Contract's language was clear and unambiguous and required that
Valley provide Union Pacific with accurate billing instructions. It is also undisputed that Valley
failed to provide accurate billing instructions, and that in the absence of any other directions to
the contrary, Union Pacific could reasonably rely on these instructions to bill Laidlaw. The trial
court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that Valley's erroneous and misleading actions
discharged Union Pacific from liability for claims of breach of contract and violation of the
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Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Valley has not presented any facts or law to indicate that the trial
court's ruling was inappropriate. Therefore, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed,
DATED this 29th day of August, 2001.
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